What price, twenty years of peace in Mizoram (1986-2006) : A Kuki perspective
In
the year 1964 the Kuki National Assembly and Manipur Mizo Integration
Council passed a resolution to achieve a single administrative unit for
the ethnic group. The resolution was signed by Holkhomang Haokip,
General Secretary of KNA and Ex-MP, and KT Lalla, Chairman of MMIC. On a
similar theme, from 15 to 18 January 1965, a convention of the various
ethnic groups took place at Kawnpui, in Churachandpur. The late LB
Thanga (Chief Secretary, Manipur, 1980-1982) notes that the event was
attended by over one hundred Mizo leaders from various political
parties.1 LINK, a news magazine from Delhi reported on 13 March 1966
[1995]: 'After three-day long deliberations,
the meeting adopted a plan
for direct action with the aim of securing a 'Mizoram State', comprising
all the areas inhabited by members of the Mizo tribe. The status of
this State whether it would be totally independent of India and
neighbouring countries was not spelled out. It was decided that a
convention for this purpose would meet in April.' In the words of late
Vumson, creation of a single administrative unit for the Kuki-Mizo
people called 'Mizoram State' was the underpinning objective of the
convention.
The organisations present at the Kawnpui
convention are: Paite National council, Vaiphei National Organisation,
Simte National Organisation, Zoumi National Organisation, Mizo Union,
Mizoram, Mizo National Front, Chin National Union, Mizo National Union,
Hmar National Union, Kuki National Assembly, Gangte Tribal Union, Kom
National Union, and Biete Convention Council.
Common ethnicity:
The
genealogy traced to the Lentlang era include the clans Lusei, Ralte,
Chawngthu, Khiangte, Hauhnar, Chuaungo, Chuauhang, Ngente, Punte and
Parte.4 Haokip and other Kukis, trace their lineage to Chawngthu. These
names represent the progenitors of the clans. The signatories of the
Kawnpui convention represent groups, who are broadly composed of a mix
of the various clans and sub-clans. A clan or sub-clan is defined by the
name of their progenitor; conversely, those composed of a mix of sub-clans is
identified as a group. For example, Lusei and Chawngthu represent
clans, and Hmar and Paite represent groups. A broad classification
applicable for the ethnic people therefore is clans and groups.
The people are genealogically linked; their culture, custom and
traditions are the same, they share a common past and speak in dialects
that are mutually intelligible. In contrast, a tribe is distinguished by
its distinct custom, culture and language, as in the case of Ao,
Angami, Sema and other Naga tribes. By this definition, the signatories
of the Kawnpui convention represent groups or in totality a single
'tribe', not separate tribes as listed in the Constitution Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order, 1956. In the
same context, the entire ethnic people may be referred to as a 'tribe',
not different tribes.
'Any Kuki Tribes' of the
Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) (Part C States) Order, 1951, Manipur,
includes names that represent sub-clans and groups that can be listed
from A - Z: Aimol, Anal, Biete, Changsan, Chongloi, Chothe, Chiru,
Doungel, Gangte, Guite, Hangshing, Haokip, Hmar, Kipgen, Kolhen, Kom,
Lamkang, Lenthang (Telien), Lhanghal, Lhangum, Lhouvum, Lhungdim,
Lunkim, Maring (Poi in Mizoram), Mate, Milhem, Misao, Monshang, Moyon,
Paite, Simte, Singsit, Singson, Sithlou, Tarao, Thangeo, Touthgang,
Vaiphei, Zou. 'Any Kuki Tribes', which was deleted in 1956, was
reintroduced in 2003 by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders
(Amendment) Act, 2002, No 10 of 2003.
With regard to
the composition of the mix of sub-clans referred to above, as an
example, those included in the category of 'Any Kuki Tribes' may be
viewed as characterising a micro-model of the ethnic stock;
themacro-model is present in the state of Mizoram and the Chin Hills
state in Burma. To illustrate the micro-model, I like to use Haokip as
an example: Among the Hmar group there is a sub-clan named Seimang.
Seimang belong to the lineage of Tellang, the youngest of the seven
brothers that make up Haokip. Thangsing and Tonsing, who are among Simte
and Paite, respectively, belong to the same lineage as Seimang, as do
Mangvum, who, are also among Lamkang, Anal and Moyon and Monshang.
Haokip is also among Kom and Vaiphei. Other examples include Guite,
Chongloi and Hangshing, who are among Paite. Guite and Doungel are of
the same lineage, and their relation, the siblings Chongloi and
Hangshing, are uncles of the twin brothers Haokip and Kipgen. In Kuki
folklore, Khochungte, in general meaning the highlands, was used to refer to this line of sub-clans: Pu Chawngthu and Pu Lenthang, who emerged from Khul, their subterranean dwelling, cleared the forest for a new settlement, which is khochung (translated from the vernacular).
Khochungte refer
to their kindred as Simte and Hmar, which means respectively those
residing to the southeast and northwest. During British rule, a greater
part of the hills surrounding Churachandpur was accorded the status of
'Haokip Reserve'. Seilmet, where the Reverend Rochunga Pudaite, who is
Hmar, has set up a college and a hospital was part of the Haokip chief,
Teisheng pa's land. Among the Kukis, a certain custom in which zu(traditional rice beer) plays a central role is observed when a chief gives land to kindred. Normally, a tall earthen jar (zubel) filled with zu is
brought by the applicant to the chief and consumed together while
formally striking the deal. Monetary transaction does not figure unless
the land is being acquired by a non-Kuki, or vice-versa.
Pearson Veng, inhabited by the Paite community, where the late Tiankham
Tonsing's eldest son Vunga has established a school in memory of his
mother, was given by the Haokip chief of Songpi. Tonsing, as mentioned
above, belongs to the Haokip clan. These specifics are cited to
highlight the bonds of clansmen and common ethnicity.
Parting of Ways :
The
armed-movement that began in 1966 to bring to fruition the political
aspiration of the people was spearheaded by the Mizo National Front, led
by Laldenga. Demkhoseh Gangte represented the Kuki contingent as
leader. Col Demkhoseh led the first successful MNF mission to China in
1974. After returning from a three-month long mission in China,
Demkhoseh surrendered to the Government of India at Imphal on 30 June
1975. The circumstance surrounding this development is murky. Various
versions exist. According to Bareh, Rev Zairema met Demkhoseh in
Manipur. The Reverend is supposed to have enquired whether it was proper
for Demkhoseh to utilise funds and material collected on behalf of MNF
from China for his personal benefit. Apparently, the reply was: if
Laldenga could use all the money received from Pakistan for his personal
use, why should he not use small amounts received from China after the
3000 mile march, 'longer than the long march of Mao Tsetung.
The
view of the MNF cadre who returned with him from China is that
Demkhoseh had no option but to surrender. Apparently, decision had been
taken to have him eliminated, as revealed under intense emotional
distress by Demkhoseh's personal Lusei body guard, who was ordered to
carry out the deed. This corroborates the allegation that Laldenga was
'considerably engaged in eliminating other leaders who were coming up in
the party [in order] to retain his position and hold. He did not
hesitate to get rid of his old colleagues and one time friends who had
left him and returned to Mizoram to live a peaceful life. The revelation
by Demkhoseh's body guard took place at Molvailup, in Ukhrul district,
bordering Burma. The incident is said to have nearly created two
opposing camps, Kuki and Mizo, almost sparking off an encounter.
Curiously, the wives of four MNF leaders, and Kapţhuami, the wife of
Demkhoseh, surrendered to the DC at Lunglei along with her children on
11 May 1973, almost two years before her husband's surrender in 1975.
This would suggest that Demkhoseh caught whiff of a possible conspiracy
against him and thus the inevitability of having to relinquish himself
to the authorities upon his return from China.
Graphic
detail of the bitter horrors suffered by many from 1966 to 1986, when
the Peace Accord was signed, perhaps does not need to be recounted at
this juncture when the focus is 'twenty years of peace'. Nevertheless,
to enlighten and sensitise the present generation blissfully reaping the
fruits of the movement, it is, perhaps, one's moral obligation to
inform that the suffering was shared, in experiences both physical and
emotional, by the people represented at Kawnpui, as by those in the
former Lushai Hills, which now alone make up Mizoram state. This
outcome, after twenty years of fighting, leaves the nagging feeling that
those outside of the former Lushai Hills were perhaps utilised during
the MNF movement, only to be excluded at the end.
A state of development:
Twenty
years of peace in Mizoram has borne commendable results. It has earned
the enviable reputation of being the oft-repeated 'model state'
in Northeast India, a region endemic with turmoil of every conceivable
hue. Comparatively, too, development is progressing at a remarkable
rate, and the people are perceptibly at ease and quite content. Whereas
potholes are the rule of most highways and byways in Northeast states,
they are an exception in Mizoram. Motor vehicles, which include the
latest models, are in abundance. It is no exaggeration that these mawtawrs plying the narrow winding roads are normally well maintained and spanking clean. On week-days, in the state's capital, Aizawl, mawtawrs may
move at a snail's pace, but it is heartening to find that a traffic
culture exists. For instance, a polite beep yields a courteous slowing
down and pulling aside by the vehicle in front to facilitate quick and
smooth over-taking. Horn blaring just does not happen.
Litter on the streets is pretty rare, thanks to the prevailing civic sense. It is also remarkable that hawkers and dawr keepers
are conscientious about using appropriate receptacles for their
rubbish. On the other hand, tobacco smoke wafts through the atmosphere
and spit-missiles randomly fly, including in public places. Perhaps
these irritants could be tackled by locating spittoons in strategic
places (which could minimise the spread of communicable diseases), and
if possible, ashtrays, too. Interestingly, while prohibition on alcohol
is heavily emphasized at the cost of precious revenue loss and in
contradiction to our age-old tradition, consumption of tobacco in its
various forms - despite proven devastating health risks involved - is
patently compromised.
A fading memory:
The
discontentment that inspired the armed movement in 1966 is now a fading
memory for the populace of the 'model state'; in the adjacent states,
including the participants' of the Kawnpui convention of 1965, it
lingers. Clause 10 of the Peace Accord, signed on 30 June 1986 states:
The
question of the unification of Mizo-inhabited areas of other States to
form one administrative unit was raised by the MNF delegation. It was
pointed out to them on behalf of the Government of India that Article 3
of the Constitution of India prescribes the procedure in this regard but
that the Government cannot make any commitment in this respect.
Although
the people that make up 'Mizo' are an ethnic group, the MNF
government's true stance on the subject of a single administrative unit -
despite the fact that it figures in the party's constitution or
manifesto - is made conspicuous by a deafening silence. If the
armed-movement of MNF gained momentum by virtue of the people's
widespread support, it is unabashedly contradicted by only a section
privileged to identify with what is deemed 'twenty years of peace' and
its dividends. Recall that in the course of the twenty years of
fighting, hundreds and thousands, mostly committed young men, had to
abandon their home and hearths, were later killed, maimed, arrested,
tortured, and many of the villages they were from burnt down.
Referring
back to the 1986 Peace Accord, certain related queries have remained
unresolved. A clear response to these would help the present generation -
and those to follow - reconcile with the recent history of which their
kith and kin was a part. It would also help them to chart their future
independent of that past.
(i) Was the Mizo delegation fully represented, and if not, why not?
(ii) Why was Clause 10 not challenged at the time, or the issue ever raised, thereafter?
(iii) Is
the present-day Mizoram state a success story of the MNF; if so, who is
to be held responsible for the original proposed state being left
unfulfilled?
(iv) Is Mizoram, which is now a divided dream, the price for 'twenty years of peace'?
The future with a past:
Where
are they to go from here, those who are not included in Mizoram
and Chin Hills? The state of affairs is so dire that these militants
dole out rations to the people, after which they are at the militants'
mercy and beck and call. In the process these militants use the village
people as shield from the Indian army. The army, whose cadres get killed
by bombs placed by the militants in Kuki areas, get rough on the
villagers. When the militants suffer losses, they torture, rape and kill
the village folk, and also subject the chiefs to perform menial tasks.
Many innocent lives have also been lost to landmines the militants have
laid in the jungles, where the village people go daily to collect wood
for fuel and vegetables and herbs for food. This is the extent of their
predicament. Most recently, Hmars from Parbung were forced to leave
their hearth and home to become refugees in Mizoram.
Would
identification with Mizo or Chin be the way out of the quagmire? At
this stage it is doubtful that the answer would be in the affirmative.
It is perhaps now time that a new paradigm is considered. Given the
background, it is time now for the population in the two states to
reciprocate and promote consensus among the ethnic population not
included within the boundaries of Mizoram and Chin Hills, which is
critical for the future of the concerned group. A section of a tribe or
two being subsumed by Chin or Mizo undermines this potential, leading to
no feasible end.
In a nutshell, it would be beneficial
to set aside differences prompted by clan domination diplomacy that
caused fragmentation of Kuki in Manipur. Such sectarian tendency is no
longer a popular sentiment. The obfuscation of the past fifty-odd years
has made many realise not to let clannishness raise its ugly head again.
Sectarianism ought to be replaced by an appropriate sense of
nationalism. Given the present predicament, it would be unwise to ignore
Kuki completely despite its certain shortcomings. In other words, let
the baby not be thrown with the bathwater! To conclude, it would be
politically prudent to invest on Kuki's historical, political and
cultural capital with a view to actualising a positive future.
In conclusion, a reiteration on consensus and reciprocity:
Consensus,
which was exercised in relation to Mizo and Chin, which yielded
favourable outcomes, now needs to be reciprocated in relation to Kuki to
sustain a political solution. Events in the past have proven that
transcending the identities Mizo or Chin to refer to the ethnic entity
beyond their respective state boundaries have been politically
counter-productive. As stated earlier, the Mizo problem has been solved,
and perhaps at the expense of Kukis. Drawing away what is part of Kuki
now to Mizo will only exacerbate the situation. If taking in Gangte as
Mizo would solve the problem in Manipur, then duly the entire lot of the
Kawnpui signatories should have been included in the 1986 Peace Accord,
not left out.
Based on the principles of consensus and
reciprocity, a general formula that would help the entire ethnic group
is to adopt the identity in relation to their specific geographical
context, e.g. accept Mizo in Mizoram, Chin in Chin Hills and Kuki in the
regions not included within the other two. Existing conditions
necessitates this pattern of shared ethnicity. By the macro-model of
ethnicity, Kuki is Mizo or Chin; conversely, Mizo and Chin can
accordingly be Kuki. This prototype again exemplifies common ethnicity.
In the present circumstance, any of these identities trying to absorb
the other will only prolong the catastrophic state of the other - in
this respect the other is Kuki. With regard to Manipur and the Sagaing
Division in Burma, therefore, promoting the identity Kuki will be an act
of exercising consensus and reciprocity for a viable political
conclusion. The identity incorporates historical legitimacy necessary
for any political action to be favourably conclusive. The Kuki chiefs,
who altogether own more than half of the existing state of Manipur,
possess legal titles for their land. Consolidating Kuki unity provides
potential to solve the crisis the people currently face and usher in a
new era of hope, peace and development.
In the context
of this discourse, and in particularly Christian semantics, 'consensus
and reciprocity' should also mean being 'charitable' towards Kuki, and
in the local vernacular translate into Tlawmngaihna.
(Source : Department of Information and Public Relations, Government of Mizoram)
